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Criminology and Violence: Reflections on Elliott Currie’s The 
Roots of Danger 
The Criminology of Violence 
Imagine if you will, we wish to write a book about violence. We know do we not what 
violence is. So what we wish to examine in this book is the question ’Why do people commit 
violent acts?’ Or, perhaps, if we are North American, ‘Why is North America peculiarly 
violent?’ Because we know do we not that this is true. Because we know what violence is we 
don’t have to be too critical in defining our terms; we could cite Oberwittler and Hoffer  
when they talk about “violent crimes that harm the physical integrity of the individual” 
(2005, p. 469). Or we may decide to follow Currie in saying as he does in his book on 
violence that he looks specifically at  
“violent crime, rather than collective forms of violence, like civil wars or 
revolutions.” And he focusses “on the kinds of violent crime that take place on the 
streets and in the homes – not on violence committed by, say, governments or 
corporations – which can be terribly destructive in its own right, as well as criminal.” 
He also focuses “on serious violent crime: not on everyday fights in the schoolyard or 
shoving matches in the local bar, but on the kinds of violence that can cause great 
physical and emotional harm – murder, rape, serious assault, robbery” (pp. 6-7). 
So we have, if not a definition of violence, a speci-fication for the kind of violence that is 
worthy of our attention. Or so it would appear. In fact, we have a speci-fication of the kind of 
violence that can be more reliably talked about.  
Imagine further, now that we have specified the boundaries of violence, we can talk about its 
distribution and dimensions (pp. 8-33). It will be necessary for us to outline the problems 
with assessing the distribution and dimensions of violent crime, paying particular attention to 
contingencies in reporting and recording practices across jurisdictions and to the variations in 
the weight accorded by those doing the recording, to the reporting of the experiences of 
different ‘kinds’ of persons from place to place; in other words, the weight accorded to each 
individual in their subjectivity. We will wish to make note of the vagaries of different ways 
of attempting to count violence from assessing hospital admissions to victim surveys. We will 
reveal, of course, that despite our specification of violence, that violence is a very slippery 
thing to measure. We will be able to say, however, that rates of violent crime differ markedly 
from country to country with Honduras having a per-head of population homicide rate 300 
times that of Japan (p. 23). We will be able to say that most violent crime is committed by 
men, and we will be able to say that by-and-large it is the poorer members of humanity that 
suffer most from, and commit more violent crime (p. 27) and that this is true even in wealthy 
societies like the USA (p. 51), where the highest levels of violent crime are to be found 
(currently) in Gary Indiana. 
Having identified the dimensions and distribution of violent crime we would be in a position, 
then, to address the meat of the book, explanations for violent crime, and ideally we would 
first take a look at those explanations that don’t work. These explanations according to Currie 
include genetic explanations, lenient sentencing, diversity, and prosperity. In each of these 
latter three cases, the United States is manifestly on the wrong side of the correlation for 
these explanations to universally, or simply, make sense of the problem of violent crime. So, 
then, we should move to the explanations taken by Currie, and other main-stream 
criminologists to be efficacious in making sense of violent crime. These include inequality, 
marginal work, weak social supports, strained families, harsh and ineffective criminal justice 
systems, and easy access to firearms. We should almost certainly agree with Currie when he 
says and I make no apology for quoting such an eloquent passage at length) 
The societies that are routinely torn by violent crime … are harsh societies – and they 
are harsh in many ways at once. They foster economic policies that create insecurity 
and deprivation at the bottom and that concentrate wealth, resources, and opportunity 
at the top. They offer few social protections for vulnerable people, and they allow the 
struggling or the unlucky to “fall through the cracks.”  They are typically punitive in 
their approach to offenders, and often their approach to child rearing as well. They are 
likely to enforce, or at least tolerate the social and economic subordination of women. 
They are neglectful societies that tend to ignore social problems until they explode 
into conflict and violence. They are societies characterized by what we might call a 
“culture of disregard”, in which people feel little sense of public responsibility or 
solidarity toward others, and a “me first” ethic of personal gain often dominates 
public and private life (p. 93). 
We might, then, albeit less skilfully, elegantly, and with somewhat poorer mastery of the 
complexity and detail of this criminological problem, arrive at a book something a little like 
that of Currie. 
 
The Violence of Criminology 
Or we might not. We might ask some other, or additional questions. We might ask, for 
example, whether the ‘defining out’ of psychological violence in intimate-partner 
relationships in our speci-fication of violent crime is material to our inquiry, or whether 
brawling in a bar is material. Is the psychological violence done to critics of various states 
around the world material, or the subjective violence inflicted upon the poorer members of 
society in the limitation of their capacities for self-actualization material? Indeed, we might 
question the whole materiality of our speci-fication of violence. Violence speci-fied in this 
way merely evokes eidos: surface or appearance, mere presence to sight. This is not the 
surface of some entity or phenomenon ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, but it is the 
surface attributed to the phenomenon by the observing investigator: the criminological 
researcher. The specification contains not that which is true, or has been observed as traits or 
qualities of violence by the criminological observer, but is created or chosen (specified) as a 
part of a symbolic order that is a tool designed or used to make criminological sense of the 
world. These boundaries are not set because they are the boundaries of violence but merely 
because they permit criminological talk about violence and hence make the violent subject 
thus identified available to governance. However, these boundaries do not permit sense 
making talk about violence per-se they merely permit talk about the phenomena (more or 
less) arbitrarily encompassed by them: speci-fied by them. This modernist doxa pre-
circumscribes attempts to make sense of the problem at hand since what is says, in an 
inverted kind of logic, is that the problem is ‘violence’ and we know what violence is do we 
not. It then accepts the criminological doxa concerning what violence is and sets about 
describing violence in more detail. We may mangle Hulsman (1986) here – thus specified, 
violence has no ontological reality, it is the product, not the object of criminological research. 
The kind of violence of which we speak as criminologists is not autopoietic, it is defined into 
existence by criminologists for criminologists.  
This, I believe, is a problem about which criminology remains in denial. The problem is a 
modernist one. For the Ptolemaian, the Copernican revolution spoke the death of faith, and 
since it is faith that dissolves the power of paradox, in the absence of faith the Ptolemaian 
required a new means of making sense of the world. Without being too rigorous, solutions 
were devised, most famously perhaps by Linnaeus; a system of classification: of division or 
speci-fication. This process of classification remains at the core of criminology today and it 
aids and abets states in their tyrannical violence over their subjects: it does not discover, it 
creates governable subjects. If, as we believe, the universe is infinite then it must be made up 
of entities of all scales, and if this is so, then the relationship of scale that entities have to one 
another are rendered simultaneously infinite and infinitesimal. We assume, for example that 
the scale of difference that separates animals from humans is greater than the scale of 
difference that separates individual humans from one another. Which of these scales of 
difference is taken to be material, depends on the problem of which we are trying to make 
sense. However, the problem of which we are trying to make sense is, itself, defined by the 
existing specification of the differences between entities. If we wish to speak of a problem 
generated by the ‘feckless poor’ we need to define the ‘feckless poor’. So, we ask the 
question ‘who are the feckless poor?’ Of course, comes the answer, they are those who are 
causing this problem. ‘And what problem would this be?’  
‘Well, obviously, it is the problem of the feckless poor’ comes the reply. 
This kind of tautologous mystification is at the heart of the mobilization of public opinion by 
those with the power and the desire to do so, namely, our rulers. More pertinently to this 
discussion is the fact that criminology operates by the same tyrannical processes (Crewe, 
2015). What this means is that the solution to any criminological problem depends upon the 
success of the definition of the materiality of the differences, or boundaries between entities 
that specify the problem. The criminologist specifies both the problem, and the entities that 
constitute that problem, from his sphere of ownness; he, like the Ptolemaian God, assembles 
the world in his own image. The problem being addressed in Currie’s book is violence, a 
process specified by him as being criminal, and hence the subject of the law. It is not new to 
suggest that the law is a product of the Modern mind (Goodrich, 1986), it is the product of the 
radical self-knowledge-belief of the Enlightenment. This radical self-knowledge-belief is also 
the ground for the claims of epistemological privilege evident in law. Hence, the product of 
the law and its claims to authority justify each other on the same grounds: a Modern 
arrogance that appears to know few bounds. As Schinkel would have it “[t]he nature of its 
self-deceit, or of its definitional self-referentiality … lies in an abstraction that is due to a 
misrepresentation of itself …” (2002, p. 135), and, we might add, ‘to itself’. Thus, the object 
of the law is subject to the violence of the law, because she is absent from the law. This is 
because it is impossible for one subject to be fully present to the subjectivity of another; the 
Other-as-she-is-for-herself is always available to her before any kind of intellection of mine. 
Hence the object of the law is also constructed by the law. Criminology is a species of violent 
modernity in that it is that study that tyrannically makes available the criminal Other as the 
possible object of governance by constituting her in her absence. The categories such as 
‘criminal’, ‘delinquent’, ‘sex offender’, or ‘serious’ violence, for example are empty 
signifiers, and they are the very sub-stance – the methodological hypokeimenon or subject-
tum – of the edifice, and practice of criminology1. 
 
Violence without criminology 
Let us look now at ways of conceiving of violence outside the bounds of criminology. We 
have suggested above that criminological study rests on the operationalization of difference, 
however, should one accept what I have said above we should also be aware that such 
operationalizations are more or less arbitrary. It is necessary, in order to identify violence 
outside of criminology, to begin, similarly, outside of criminology in the realm of the un-
                                                     
1 For the most extreme version of this see the FBI’s ‘Unified Crime Reports’ crime categories. 
speci-fied. Without crossing over into the metaphysical, we can dip our toes into the 
transcendent, so to speak, in that we can begin from the position of the human subject. The 
nature of our subjectivity is unique to each of us, furthermore, every human possesses some 
kind of subjectivity2 in that it is inextricably bound up with the capacity to represent 
ourselves to ourselves as ourselves, or the experience of being a subject, which condition 
persists at the highest possible level of generalization of the nature of the human, and what 
Mead contests is what constitutes the very process of self (2015 [1934]) in view of our 
capacity for intentionality3. Moreover, it is this capacity that permits us to ‘measure’ the 
similarity and difference between us and others because we can represent both to ourselves. 
Further to this, however, we might strongly suggest we have privileged access to our 
subjectivity. In Levinasian terms, we exist for-ourselves before any intellection of any other, 
or as Sartre says, our observation of the subjectivity of another is always undertaken from our 
own subjectivity (1967 [1957]). What this means, just as in the case of criminology and the 
law, is that the object of our perception is absent from our construction of her. In other words, 
what we see we do not discover, we make, and this of course, is itself a form of violence. 
This kind of violence is, to my mind, related to a more insidious kind of violence that is 
powerfully implicated in the kind of violence on which Currie wishes to concentrate. Currie’s 
violence is partial, that of which I spoke a moment ago and of which I now speak are 
universal. Let us return to The Subject and the question, apparent in Husserl, ‘how is the 
intentional content of our experience of other minds constituted’? (1969). If we are to grasp 
this other-centred constitution of meaning, we must establish the facticity of the Other-as-
she-is-for-herself. This cannot be done by invoking any speci-fication or difference 
(particularly difference from me as encouraged by Husserl (1969, p. 107)) since such a 
                                                     
2 See Thomas Nagel What is it Like to Be a Bat (1974) 
3 Not intent, but directedness of mind. 
judgement – or measurement – would have to arise from my sphere of ownness. In the face of 
this solipsism of Husserl’s, Sartre (1967 [1957], p. 302) encourages us to begin with the way 
we experience our selves as the object of the Other. According to Sartre, should we inhabit 
the world as a monad we would experience only the haeceity of the world, i.e., we would be 
able merely to consume its isness. We would not be able to thematise it since there would be 
no other with whom to negotiate meanings4: the world would have no aboutness. This is 
emphasised in Sartre by his insistence that our first encounter (our first movement5) with the 
Other manifests itself in the form of shame. When another approaches me in my role as mere 
consumer of the isness of the world, says Sartre, I am cast by her as a voyeur (1967 [1957], p. 
353). These meanings, for Sartre, are a species of normativity, and clearly relate the 
existential (intersubjective6) nature of the world to its normative structure in that they arise 
from the freedom present in the separation of the for-itself from the in-itself (Sartre, 1967 
[1957]). However, we may observe of Sartre’s relation of freedom and normativity that 
normativity is constraint, and, we take it, freedom is its absence. How then should we 
proceed in the face of this paradox? The answer is to be found in Levinas. 
We must first state when speaking of Levinasian ethics, that Levinas is not in the business of 
constructing an ethic like Rawls ‘fairness’ or Kant’s ‘Categorical Imperative’ for example. 
Levinas is not interested in some ethical prescription or test, he is interested in the place of 
the ethical in the intersubjective relationship: how I, the subject, stand vis-a-vis the Other. 
This is in no manner a code or set of rules. For Sartre, the Other brings with her a law, the 
establishment of normativity that defines my freedom by showing its limits since it reveals a 
contest between two competing claims for freedom, and the claim of the Other can only be 
                                                     
4 Witness Wittgenstein’s (1976 [1953]) ‘Private Language’ argument. 
5 Following Husserl when he says “the intrinsically first other (the first non-Ego) is the Other ego” (Husserl, 
1969, p. 107) 
6 C.f. Heidegger, ‘Being and Time’ (1996 [1926]) for the relationship between the existential and the 
intersubjective. 
recognized by me from my own subjectivity. Hence (because it arises from my subjectivity) 
Sartre says that this must be the second movement (1967 [1957], p. 382), however, our 
attempt to identify the root of the intersubjective and its ethicality must be to establish the 
nature of the ‘first movement’. Levinas addresses this problem by insisting that the Other 
brings with her not a law but a command, and she brings this to the relationship before I have 
any intellection of her. A command does not merely come into conflict with my freedom as 
would a law, but it creates an obligation from which I cannot resile. The command revealed 
by (the face7 of) the Other is “thou shalt not commit murder” (Levinas, 1969, p. 199). 
Levinas notes elsewhere that this command “is the end of powers”  (op. cit. , p. 87) the end of 
my freedom, my ‘I can’8. That is, not that my freedom can be done away with nor that my 
freedom no longer conflicts with the freedom of others but that my freedom has a limit and 
that limit is set by a command in a way that a law cannot. Of course, one may argue, I can 
commit murder and one would be right, however, this does not eradicate the command, this 
simply means that were I to kill, I would have chosen to ignore or transgress the command: 
neither the command nor the obligation goes away. In killing I have failed in my obligation, 
not eradicated it. The command reveals an irrevocable asymmetry that is a 
phenomenologically necessary quality of my relationship with the other in that she constitutes 
me in my experience by my response to the command emanating from her, prior to her in any 
way entering my experience. My first experience of myself is formed in my obligation to her 
before any kind of communality. Hence the command (the obligation) uncovers the 
normative nature of the intersubjective; the ethical and the mode of experiencing anything as 
                                                     
7 There is not room here to examine Levinas’ concept ‘The Face’. For a discussion of this concept see Peperzak 
(1997); Morgan (2011); Perpich (2008). 
8 For an examination of the relationship between ‘power’ and capacity (‘can’) see my 2014 (pp. 137-164 Chap. 
7) or my (2010). 
anything at all (normativity9) are disclosed as being inseparable: ethics is shown to be first 
philosophy. 
I mentioned earlier that Levinas is not interested in a set of ethical rules but in the place of the 
ethical in the intersubjective, the structure of which I have adumbrated above. What this 
means to us in our consideration of violence is that we do violence to the Other every time we 
fail in our obligation to her, which obligation is elicited by her command. This, of course is 
not just limited to murder. The obligation to the Other is infinite and manifests itself, 
according to Levinas in a universal responsibility. Levinas’ insistence that rather than Sartre’s 
‘law’, the Other brings a command, and that a command imposes an irrecusable obligation, 
the question ‘Who am I?’ cannot be answered by recourse to my own experience. It must 
happen by examining my response to the obligation to the Other before I have any 
communality with her whatsoever, and this response discloses my respons-ibility for the 
other; I can, therefore I must respond. Responsibility, however, has more dimensions that we 
generally imagine. I may speak of responsibility to myself, responsibility for myself, 
responsibility for myself to others, and responsibility for others10. It is the latter of these 
which is of interest here. Conventionally when we speak of responsibility for others we have 
in mind the kind of relationship that frequently occurs between children and parents in virtue 
of the perceived deficiencies of childhood. Levinas, in contrast, has in mind not an 
‘accounting for’ oneself or ‘answering for’ another, but where the responsible self is an 
irreplaceable substitute for the Other: any and every Other. Hence, axiomatically, and 
without any possibility if things being otherwise, I sublimate my responsibility for myself or 
to myself into responsibility for the other, resulting in the erasure of my ‘ego’. This ego is the 
self-replicating bunker from whence modernity launches its violence: the violence that 
                                                     
9 For a brief statement of the relation between normativity and the origin of intersubjectivity see my (2015), 
also Perpich (2008). In detail, of course, Sartre ( Op. cit.). 
10 I have elsewhere referred to these kinds of responsibility as ‘mere responsibility’ (2011 Op. cit.). 
constrains the freedom of all others solely from my sphere of ownness. All violence is of this 
form, and Currie’s ‘serious’ violence is therefore merely a subset (although a nasty one) 
thereof. What this further means it that violence is universal and that any attempt to speci-fy 
it is in itself an act of violence upon those thus specified (c.f. inter alia, Becker, 1963) and, 
perhaps more importantly, those excluded from the specification (victims of intimate-partner 
psychological violence or slavery for example). This, for me, is an important aspect of 
Currie’s text. One might suggest that acts of ‘serious’ violence axiomatically must involve a 
‘serious’ abrogation of the perpetrator’s responsibility for the Other-as-she-is-for-herself, 
however, a similar abrogation occurs in queue (line) jumping, illegal parking, dropping litter, 
playing music too loud, promoting climate change, imposing low wages, people trafficking, 
high bonuses, poor safety standards, et cetera ad infinitum; indeed, all those behaviours (and 
more) that critical criminologists have struggled for decades to bring under the banner of 
conventional (administrational, evaluative) criminology. Violence does not have to “harm the 
physical integrity of the individual” (Oberwittler & Hofer, 2005, p. 469) violence is 
universal, it is embedded in the impossibility of fully satisfying our obligations to the Other. 
Criminology without violence 
This position is interesting for criminology; it suggests that the ethical is at the root of all 
intersubjectivity – all social relations. It has been suggested to me in numerous conversations 
that criminology has nothing to do with ethics and vice versa. Clearly, however, since 
criminology is entirely bound up with the social, axiomatically the ethical must matter to it – 
it must be mater-ial. Because I do not choose this obligation freely I cannot pass on my 
responsibility to others: I cannot ask another to stand in my shoes. Of this state of affairs 
Levinas was wont to invoke Dostoevsky in the Brothers Karamazov:  
I am responsible for the Other without waiting for his reciprocity.... Reciprocity is his 
affair.... It is I who support all, [... as in] that sentence in Dostoevsky: "We are all 
guilty of all and for all men before all, and I more than the others." This is not owing 
to such or such a guilt which is really mine, or to offences that I would have 
committed; but because I am responsible for a total responsibility, which answers for 
all the others and for all in the others, even for their responsibility. I always have one 
responsibility more than the others (Levinas in Vinokurof, 2013). 
This realization brings to criminology new obligations, challenges, and opportunities. A 
commonly held view of the purpose of criminology is that it is intended to help reduce crime. 
Some say, because the nature of crime is in the gift of power, that criminology should seek to 
reduce harm11. The role of any kind of inquiry is to reduce suffering. Any kind of suffering 
that can be reduced and isn’t constitutes violence, if only by omission. Failure to fulfil our 
obligation to the other, to reduce their suffering, constitutes a derogation of our duty as 
human beings since being in this ethical relationship with Others is what constitutes us as 
human. Criminology, then, must cease to do violence by leaving behind its scientistic, 
rational, and Modern past: it must refuse dualistic modes of thought, it must dissolve all the 
boundaries it has spent the past one hundred and fifty years assembling. We must recognize 
that in addition to being unable to grasp the full nature of the other’s subjectivity because it 
originates in our experience, we cannot know the whole of the assemblage that constitutes the 
Other in their being: the trace of everything that they have been, thought, or experienced in 
any way. Hence we do violence whenever we attempt to judge or categorize, and we do this 
every time we speak of crime; we seem to wish only to alleviate the suffering of those 
                                                     
11 For a discussion on crime harm and power see my (2011) 
deemed material to the law. We must cease to judge; we must simply bear witness to crime 
and social justice, as Quinney (2000) would have it. 
Modern Western philosophy is suffused with the telos of perfection – an inexorable 
procession with homo-rationalicus in the van. Not only is rationality tautologically defined it 
constitutes a ‘regime of truth’ in Foucault’s (1977) terms.  
Universal suffering 
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Explanation for this kind of violence 
Why is violence a response to these strains 
 
We have, in these pages, a kind of violence defined into existence that suits the purpose of 
the book. 
 
